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Abstract 
Regional governments’ discretion in allocating structural funds is mainly limited by 
the competences of the Commission to control implementation and fiscal activities of 
decentralized governments. In this paper, we analyse implementation of ERDF funds 
in Eastern Germany in the financial perspective 2007 to 2013 to show how allocation 
of the funds follows the objectives formulated in the programmes. We find that less 
rural regions and some economic sectors benefit by more than others. A few 
beneficiaries control the highest share of the funds. This indicates that political 
economy forces in the allocation process may benefit well organised groups.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the top priorities of the European Union (EU) is to increase economic welfare 
for its member states. The introduction of a European single market is intended to 
increase free trade between the members by allowing for a better allocation of 
resources and, hence, overall welfare gains for the EU.1 Agglomeration and 
dispersion forces interact to determine the relocation of production so that potential 
gains from trade are distributed unevenly across regions (Karayalcin and 
Yilmazkuday 2015, Brülhart 2011, Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002). 
In order to mitigate negative effects associated with deepening the European single 
market, the European Commission maintains cohesion policy to compensate those 
regions and citizens. The structural funds are widely accepted as an instrument to 
reduce regional disparities in economic development by investing in human capital 
and modernizing infrastructure. EU regional policy were the second largest part of 
the EU budget in the last funding period (i.e. 2007 to 2013) and will maintain a large 
share in EU budget in the upcoming financing periods. It aims to satisfy the 
heterogeneous needs of regions which fulfil the agreed criteria. There is evidence 
that the EU’s structural actions were partly effective regarding the aim to promote 
economic convergence (Neumark and Simpson 2015, Mohl and Hagen 2009). But, 
there is also evidence that political factors on the recipient side explain the 
ineffectiveness of European transfers in terms of income convergence (Beugelsdijk 
and Eijfinger 2005). Dellmuth and Stoffel (2012:429)) argue that governments that 
direct transfers “to please voters” could distort the intended effects on socioeconomic 
development. In addition, whenever there are EU financial flows involved, some 
forms of rent-seeking appear, since several actors want to obtain a share of it 
(Kalman 2002). 
The allocation and implementation process is very complex. In order to achieve a 
more effective implementation of structural funds, the EU builds upon the 
“partnership principle” according to which structural actions should be carried out in 
partnership with the Commission, regional authorities and local private actors that are 
potential beneficiaries of the funds. The rationale behind that principle is the idea that 
a process including private actors allows to produce policy outcomes that further EU 
goals, as a partnership can help to make the use of resources more transparent. 
Previous research has shown that potential partners do not feel adequately 
addressed by regional authorities during the programming and implementation phase 
and numerous requests of members of regional parliaments indicate that they also 
appear to have no systematic access to information on funds implementation (Blom-
Hansen 2005, Dellmuth 2011b).  
                                           
1 See Calin-Vlad (2013) for distribution of gains from trade in the EU. The most detailed survey of 
literature on the effects of international trade on economic growth is Singh (2010). 
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In this paper we analyse the implementation of the European regional development 
fund (ERDF) across East German Länder in the funding period 2007 to 2013 based 
on operational programmes, implementation reports and the lists of final beneficiaries 
to show how allocation of funds follows the objectives formulated in the programmes. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we summarize the principles of 
implementation of EU cohesion policy instruments and discuss how regional actors 
influence the allocation of funds. Section 3 presents political economy aspects on 
how incentives of actors may shape the outcome of the allocation process. Results 
from ERDF funds implementation across East German Länder are discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Cohesion Policy: Allocation and Implementation of Structural Funds 
The aim of cohesion policy is to promote economic and social cohesion across 
Europe by reducing disparities between regions and countries. The 1988 reforms 
doubled the budget for structural funds and introduced a number of principles for the 
implementation of cohesion policy (Bachtler and Mendez 2007).2  
The allocation of structural funds follows objective eligibility criteria (Council 
Regulation 1083/2006): EU regional policy makers have adopted three main 
objectives to limit the number of regions eligible for funding in the period 2007 to 
2013: The convergence objective is to cover the member states and regions whose 
development is lagging behind. The regional competitiveness and employment 
objective is to cover the territory of the community outside the convergence 
objective.3 The third objective, European territorial cooperation, is to cover regions 
having land or sea frontiers and actions intend to promote integrated territorial 
development. Although the EU Commission formulate overall thematic objectives 
which are supported by funding, regions are allowed to set up their own operational 
programmes based on specific needs.  
One of the process requirements of the EU regional policy is the ‘partnership 
principle’ according to which structural actions should be carried out in partnership 
with the Commission, regional authorities and private actors that are potential 
beneficiaries (article 11). The partnership principle requires that operational 
programmes (OP) should receive much input from local actors with respect to 
funding priorities. 
                                           
2 The principle of (1) concentration on a limited number of objectives and focused on the least 
developed regions; (2) additionality, to ensure that EU funding does not substitute for national 
expenditures; (3) programming, based on strategic, multi-annual plans instead of project-based 
approach; and (4) partnership, i.e. participation of national, sub-national and supranational actors in 
the design and implementation of programmes. 
3 The regions eligible for funding are those previously funded under objective 1 in the 2000 to 2006 
programming period and which no longer satisfy the regional eligibility criteria of the convergence 
objective. These regions benefit from a transitional aid, as well as all the other regions of the 
community (Article 8). 
 6 
The rationale behind the partnership principle is the idea that a process involving 
actors from the private sector is suitable to produce policy outcomes that increases 
the EU’s efficiency and equity goals, since the partnership can help to make the use 
of resources and the process as such more transparent and visible to potential 
beneficiaries (Dellmuth 2011b:21) and, thus, could reduce the lack of relevant 
projects applications. The partnership with local actors can increases the absorption 
of structural spending in the region and the completion of projects in reasonable time 
frame. Much effort in studying EU cohesion policy has been put into the questions of 
who the relevant actors are and how much power they have to push forward their 
interest. The institutional process in EU structural policy is complex and several 
actors are involved in the negotiation process that surrounds the allocation of the EU 
structural funds (Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2012).4  
After the European Council has established the total budget for each objective, the 
European Commission shall make indicative breakdowns by member states with 
respect to the ‘commitment appropriations’ (Article 18(2) in Council Regulation 
1083/2006). At this stage the national governments have some discretion since they 
can put forward a list of regions eligible for receiving structural funds (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001:97; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012:416). An objective criteria for regions at 
NUTS2 level is the per capita income in relation to EU average to classify regions for 
different funds. The lists are negotiated with and approved by the European 
Commission (Bachtler and Mendez 2007).  
In the second stage, the structural programming phase (Articles 32 to 33), the 
member states develop a multiannual investment plan for each objective (Article 11). 
Sub-state governments maintain substantial discretion when developing these plans 
since the financial perspective does not specify precise funding objectives (Dellmuth 
and Stoffel 2012). At this stage, sub-national authorities have a say in both the 
selection of the regions and the elaborations of the plans (Bodenstein and 
Kemmerling 2012). The Member states have to submit to the Commission the 
development plans including the corresponding financial allocation to each objective. 
The recipient government’s discretion in developing the plans is limited by the 
Commission ability to negotiate modifications to programme strategies (Article 33). 
The Commission transforms the plans into a legally binding decision that specifies 
the amount of funding during the programming period.  
Two kind of bargaining take place (Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2012): in the first 
level, member states and, potentially, the European Commission negotiate the total 
budgetary covering of the funds for each member state. In the second level, the 
programming phase, bargaining potentially takes place between national 
                                           
4 The council regulation 1260/1999 sets out the distribution of structural funds in the period 2000 to 
2006 and can be described as a two-stage process. This process has been maintained in the funding 
period of 2007 to 2013 and will be kept in current period of 2014 to 2020 (council regulation 
1303/2013). 
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governments and the regions. When sub-state governments allocate EU funds at 
local level, there is a contractual relationship between the Commission and the 
regions in which the investment strategies will be shaped by political incentives with 
respect to expected re-election outcomes and the influence of economic and social 
partners. But, if electoral concerns of recipient governments drive allocation of funds, 
then this may help explain the effectiveness of spending and the variation in the 
outcomes such as growth and convergence (see e.g. Mohl and Hagen 2008). 
According to Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005), countries might be inclined not to 
raise the welfare level of those regions which are close to the critical value of getting 
EU support, as this would possibly imply a reduction in future financial support. It is 
possible that the moral hazard effect might lead to an inappropriate use of the funds. 
Given the sensitivity of EU Cohesion Policy to specific regional needs, Bähr (2008) 
argues that member states with a higher degree of decentralisation should be able to 
implement more effective programmes since regional authorities have better 
information on specific growth inducing projects. 
Based on the regulatory framework for the financial perspective 2007 to 2013, funds 
allocation across beneficiaries takes place at the regional level. In Germany, the 
funds are, first, apportioned between the Länder and the federal level. Usually 
structural actions are negotiated within the committee responsible for decisions 
related to the joint agreement for the improvement of the regional economic structure 
(Planungsausschuss). The negotiation of the EU structural funds’ allocation takes 
place within informal meetings of working groups of the second chamber (Bundesrat) 
(Dellmuth 2011b:18). The regional governments of the Länder delegated to the 
working groups prepare the decisions made in conferences of the state ministers 
(Fachministerkonferenz). The conference of ministers for economic affairs 
(Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz) deals with allocation of the ERDF funds, while the 
conference of the ministers for labour and social affairs (Arbeits- und 
Sozialministerkonferenz) deals with allocation of ESF funds. The conference of the 
state ministers decides on an allocation key taking several criteria into account, e.g. 
regional economic performance and unemployment rates.  
In the implementation phase, governments invest the funds in local projects across a 
range of areas such as business development, transport and communication 
infrastructure. Since investment plans do not entail clear-cut eligibility criteria for 
projects, governments retain some discretion when choosing single projects for 
funding. The member states, according to articles 59 to 62, had to appoint a 
managing authority (Verwaltungsbehörde) (a public authority to manage the OP), a 
certification body (Bescheinigungsbehörde) (a public authority to certify the statement 
of expenditure and payment applications transferred to the EU Commission), and an 
auditing body (Prüfbehörde) (to oversee the efficient running of management and 
monitoring systems).  
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The managing authorities decide on the allocation of funds across beneficiaries 
(Article 60). The approval of projects involves several public actors 
(zwischengeschaltete Stellen) that support the managing authorities (Article 59). 
Project applicants should consult these intermediary bodies (such as 
Investitionsbank and different units within the state ministries. They review 
applications and provide financial means granted to the respective projects (see e.g. 
TMWAT 2007:106; MW Land Brandenburg 2007:191; MWAT Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 2007:151). Only large and major projects need additional approval from 
managing authorities.  
During the funding period, the Commission has a supervisory role. The transfer 
payment and the co-financing from the funds is made when the Commission 
reimburses the aggregated statements of expenditures of the Länder governments 
(Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012). Managing authorities enjoy considerable discretion to 
implement the OP and distribute the funds, since the eligibility criteria for selecting 
beneficiaries are set at national level. This implies a greater responsibility of regional 
authorities managing the funds. 
 
3. Political economy of regional allocation of structural funds  
A few studies address the allocation of intergovernmental funds from a political 
economy point of view and for EU structural funds (Bodenstein and Kemmerling 
2012; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012; Dellmuth 2011a; Bouvet and Dall’Erba 2010; 
Kemmerling and Bodenstein 2006; Blom-Hansen 2005; De Rynck and Mc Aleavey 
2001). Most studies draw on insights from models explaining the political motives 
behind the allocation of intergovernmental grants in general and other public 
spending programs.  
These models predict that in situations where upper-layer governments have leeway 
in the distribution of funds, a politically biased allocation to jurisdictions should take 
place, which comes under the term of ‘vote buying’. 5 In terms of EU structural 
spending the allocation of funds to the regions may deviate from the optimal structure 
of allocation – i.e. in which funds are spend according to objective eligibility criteria. 
Empirical results for Spain suggest that government has incentive to allocate funds to 
jurisdictions which are governed by the same party, since grants given to opposition 
parties do not bring any votes (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008).  
                                           
5 See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993) and Dixit and Londregan (1998), for the “swing voter model”. 
Most recent evidence is found in Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003), Castells and 
Solé-Ollé (2005), Kemmerling and Stephan (2002). The alternative “core voter model” claims that 
politicians are risk averse (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Nichter (2008), Leigh (2008), Ansolabehere and 
Snyder (2006), and Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2003). 
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The development of regional policy in the EU - especially the partnership principle - 
has introduced regional actors into the political system creating a third level of 
bargaining, i.e. between the Commission and the regions (Marks 1993, Hooghe and 
Marks 2001). Some studies argue that constitutional strong regions, i.e. regions in 
countries with federal constitutions that strengthen regional autonomy, have 
benefited from increasing power-sharing between actors in EU regional politics 
(Marks et al. 2002; Hooghe and Keating 1994).  
According to Bauer (2001) and Blom-Hansen (2005), sub-state governments and the 
Commission act in a kind of principal-agent relationship, since they are engaged in a 
contractual relation with respect to funds allocation.6 The governments’ discretion in 
allocating funds to the region is mainly limited by the competences of the 
Commission to control how the funds are spent. The Commission has few incentives 
to interfere with governments’ funding strategies, because monitoring procedures 
and sanctions are costly.7 Regional governments, on the other hand, should be less 
concerned about how EU expenditure affects their budgets. They face less pressure 
from citizens to use these funds efficiently, because citizens perceive these funds as 
other people’s money (Bird and Smart 2002, Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012). Bodenstein 
and Kemmerling (2012) find that some regions receive significantly more funds per 
capita than others and argue that federalist regions should be better capable of 
acquiring transfers than unitary countries because constitutional competencies on the 
regional level give rise to a regional political infrastructure that is conducive to 
lobbying and political pressure (see also Kemmerling and Stephan 2008). The 
empirical results tend to support this argument for objective 1 funding, but not for 
objective 2 funding allocation (see also Dellmuth (2011a)). 
Regional partisan politics can influence the allocation of structural funds (Marks et al. 
2002). In regions that are dominated by parties with a high ideological preference for 
regional policy, regional politicians will lobby harder for structural funds than national 
governments will do. Evidence is mixed: Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) find that 
both left and Eurosceptic parties attract more EU funds to their regions, while 
Dellmuth (2011a) does not support this argument either on a left-right or on a pro-anti 
Europe dimension. All regions would be equally interested in more transfer payment. 
However, the Commission has incentives to allocate more transfers to 
constitutionally strong regions because they can mobilize more resources and 
expertise to manage the funds more effectively (Dellmuth 2011a). They are also 
more able to provide the Commission with relevant information it needs to control 
                                           
6 The principal (i.e. the Commission) delegates authority to agents (i.e. the regional government) and 
tries to provide them with incentives to make them behave in a way that maximizes the utility of both 
the principal and the agent, i.e. structure the intergovernmental transfer in ways that promote EU 
funding goals (Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012). 
7 If the Commission pursues an agenda that fundamentally differs from the preferences of member 
governments, member states may ‘cut the wings’ of the Commission when reforming the funds policy 
for the next funding period (Pollack 1995, 2003). 
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implementation.8 Recipient governments, on the other hand, will refrain from 
reporting misallocations of funds, because this may limit their chances of receiving a 
similar or even greater amount of support in the following funding periods. Although 
the Commission has little incentive to control whether the projects are suitable for 
reaching EU goals, it should have incentives to make governments spend the 
available funds irrespective of whether EU goals are met.9 The allocation in German 
local districts suggests that, indeed, the distributive choice of sub-state governments 
is systematically related to their electoral incentives by directing funds towards the 
strongholds of the prime minister’s party (Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012). 
In order to achieve a more effective implementation of funds, i.e. in accordance with 
EU funding goals, the EU builds upon the “partnership principle” which requires that 
set up and implementation of the OP should receive input from local actors. A few 
studies evaluate the process of structural funds implementation by means of 
interviews. They are sceptical as to whether EU requirements regarding the 
governance process are effectively pursued (Dellmuth 2011b, Blom-Hansen (2005). 
Member states are likely to be more mindful of national concerns than of any goals 
set by the EU (Blom-Hansen (2005: 637). Within partnerships the debates follow a 
“gentlemanly agreement” not to criticise other partners’ actions in the presence of the 
Commission and central government authorities (Rynck and McAleavey 2001:545f.). 
The interviews suggest that the political process is characterized by an information 
asymmetry that benefits well-organised groups, because they can mobilise resources 
and expertise to develop projects better than other social groups. Especially “low 
income groups, which tend to be less integrated socially, will face the considerable 
barrier of organizing collective action first, before being able to gain access to 
partnerships and become beneficiaries” (Rynck and Mc Aleavey 2001:546). The 
pressure to spend (on time) what has been agreed upon gives a natural advantage to 
the strongly organized groups within the regions, which tend to be better informed 
and linked to the relevant networks” (Rynck and Mc Aleavey 2001:546). 
Given that the intention behind the preliminary talks between Länder governments, 
county districts and the municipalities in the beginning is to ensure a swift absorption 
of EU funds during the funding period, this communication strategy can be selective 
and favour specific areas, depending on the political priorities of state governments 
(Dellmuth (2011b:20). The literature is critical of the extent to which policy-makers 
pursue EU goals when implementing the funds (Santos 2008). For example, regional 
policy makers throughout Europe have not systematically adopted the Lisbon 
strategy but have pursued their own funding priorities (Danish Technological Institute 
                                           
8 The failures of domestic authorities can cause reputation problems for the Commission with regard to 
its effectiveness and credibility (Majone 2000). Since bad reputation “may stick in the public 
perception, it will further limit the Commission’s political room for manoeuvre” (Bauer 2008:629).  
9 Absorbing the funds is the best strategy to ensure equal or more funding during the next funding 
period, since the Commission will be blamed for errors during the implementation of the EU budget by 
its European peers, e.g. when funds are not spent (Bauer 2006).  
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2005), such that resources may be targeted to the economic centres rather than to 
deprived areas (Santos 2008, Dellmuth 2011b). Against this background we analyse 
how the implementation of the funds in Eastern Germany follows in accordance with 
the committed OP and how distribution of the funds benefit the areas and sectors 
that do need financial support for reasons of social and economic convergence.  
 
4. Implementation of structural funds in Eastern Germany 
Committed level of allocation 
According to the committed allocations of structural funds, German regions receive 
around 25 billion Euro of structural funds in the financial perspective 2007 to 2013. 
East German Länder receive funds under the convergence objective while West 
German governments invest funds under the regional competitiveness and 
employment (RCE) objective. Around 80 percent of the structural funds is managed 
by the regional Länder governments of which East German Länder manage the 
highest amount of funds (around 12 billion Euro (48.8%)). More than two thirds of the 
committed funds stem from the ERDF. East German regions receive reimbursement 
of up to 75 per cent of eligible cost for projects granted under the convergence 
objective (Article 53 and annex III), while in West German regions the contribution 
from the funds (ERDF and ESF) under RCE-objective is up to 50 per cent of eligible 
expenditures. Thus, the required (additional) regional public funds to co-financing the 
funds are much lower in East than in West German regions. East Germany receives 
also higher per capita funds. Dellmuth (2011b:6) notes that regions incur indirect 
costs because the country in which they are located contributes to the overall budget 
of the EU.10 Saxony receives the highest net benefits per inhabitant among East 
Germany, despite the fact that it has the highest per capita income.  
The most severe problem is that regions at the NUTS 2 level qualify for funding 
(Article 35) and some relatively rich NUTS 3 regions within these NUTS 2 aggregates 
may receive structural funds although their per capita GDP exceeds the threshold 
(Becker et al. 2010). Some low income NUTS 3 regions within wealthy NUTS 2 
aggregates (e.g. in West German regions) would qualify for the funds if the rules for 
NUTS 2 had been applied at NUTS 3 level (see e.g. Dellmuth 2011b).  
 
Geographical allocation of the funds 
Table 1 shows the geographical allocation of the funds in the East German Länder. 
By the end of 2013, Thuringia invested most of the ERDF funds in rural regions. Less 
than 40% of the ERDF funds were directed towards projects in urban areas. The 
level of structural funds to be spent in urban areas was committed to be 45%. 
                                           
10 German Länder do not contribute directly to the EU budget, but Germany is a net contributor. Net 
balances of German Länder can be assessed based on the regions contribution to the given country’s 
income (Santos 2008). 
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Table 1: Allocation of ERDF funds in Eastern Germany (2007-2013): Pre- and post- implementation by type of region 
  
Thuringia Saxony Saxony-Anhalt 
Mecklenburg-West-
Pomerania 
Brandenburg 
  Pre 
(2007) 
Post 
(2013) 
Funds 
absorp. 
Pre 
(2013) 
Post 
(2013) 
Funds 
absorp. 
Pre 
(2012) 
Post 
(2013) 
Funds 
absorp. 
Pre 
(2007) 
Post  
(2013) 
Funds 
absorp. 
Pre 
(2007) 
Post  
(2013) 
Funds 
absorp. 
 Type of region      
01 Urban areas 664.9  
(45.0%) 
483.3  
(39.2%) 
72.7% 633.0  
(20.5%) 
1842.4  
(62.2%) 
291% 425.0  
(22.0%) 
833.4  
(45.6%) 
196% 604.0  
(48.2%) 
0,0 0% 909.5  
(60.7%) 
860.9  
(65.8%) 
94.7% 
05 Rural areas  812.7  
(55.0%) 
748.8  
(60.8%) 
92.1% 0.0 278.6  
(9.4%) 
- 1506.8  
(78.0%) 
995.6  
(54.4%) 
66.1% 648.4  
(51.8%) 
1027.8  
(100%) 
159% 356.6  
(23.8%) 
307.5  
(23.5%) 
86.2% 
09 Transnat. coop. 
area 
0.0 0.0 - 0.0 .0 - 0.0 0.0 - 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0.0 - 
00 Not applicable 0.0 0.0 - 2458.1  
(79.5%) 
841.2  
(28.4%) 
34.2% 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 232.7  
(15.5%) 
140.0  
(10.7%) 
60.2% 
 Total in m€ 1478 1232  83.4% 3091 2962 95.8% 1932 1829 94.7% 1252 1028  82.1% 1499 1308 87.3% 
Sources: TMWAT (2007, 2013); MW Land Brandenburg (2007); MWE Land Brandenburg (2014); SMWAV (2013) Table 33 p. 304; SMWAV (2014); Land 
Sachsen-Anhalt (2013) Table 6.7, 6.8, 6.9; MF Sachsen-Anhalt (2014) Table 22, 23, 8, 9, 10, 11; MWAT Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2007); Gemeinsame 
Verwaltungsbehörde des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2014).  
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The opposite is, however, the case in all other East German Länder. Saxony-Anhalt, 
for example, spends twice the amount of funds to projects in urban areas than 
committed. Brandenburg allocates funds in favour of urban projects. In Saxony less 
than 10 % of the funds were assigned to rural areas. 
Since East Germany is also among the major beneficiaries of the CAP funding 
scheme (i.e. funds from the EAGF and under the rural development policy scheme), 
Bonfiglio et al. (2015) also find that the distribution of CAP funds across European 
regions seems less rural than stated in its political intention: urban and central 
regions tend to be more supported by CAP funds than rural and peripheral regions. 
In terms of ERDF expenditures, managing authorities do not provide deeper 
information on how they classify NUTS 3 level regions along the urban-rural-
typology.  
Figure 1: Committed and granted ERDF funds by type of region (2007-13) 
 
Note: Predominantly urban regions (rural population: <20 % of the total population), Intermediate 
regions (rural population: 20–50 % of total population), predominantly rural regions (rural population: 
>50 % of total population). A region which has been classified as predominantly rural (intermediate) 
becomes an intermediate (predominantly urban) region, if it contains a city of more than 200,000 
inhabitants (500,000 inhabitants) representing at least 25 % of the regional population.  
Source: own calculation based on latest implementation reports published by the East German Länder 
in the year 2013, Eurostat (2015a,b,c). 
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According to the Eurostat (2015c) definition, as much as 47 % of the population in 
Thuringia is living in areas classified as predominantly rural (figure 1).1, GDP figures 
are similar: 45 % of the gross domestic product can be allocated to rural type 
regions. The share of the rural population in Thuringia is even higher than in other 
East German Länder: 39 % in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, 28 % in Saxony-Anhalt 
and 24 % in Brandenburg. Any region in Saxony is classified as rural. 
However, expenditures at NUTS 3 level (Landkreise) is provided by Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt (SMWAV (2014:60f), MF Sachsen-Anhalt (2014:17)). Managing 
authorities in both Länder tend give grants to areas classified as ‘predominantly 
urban’ and ‘intermediate’ NUTS 3 regions by more – in per capita terms - than to 
projects in ‘predominantly’ rural areas. Saxony-Anhalt spends more than twice the 
amount of ERDF funds - in per capita terms - in ‘less rural’ (i.e. ‘intermediate’) 
regions (933 Euro per capita) than in ‘predominantly rural’ areas (398 Euro per 
capita). In Saxony, 85 % of the ERDF funds can be directly linked to regions at NUTS 
3 level (Landkreise). Especially urban NUTS 3 regions in Saxony receive a higher 
per capita amount (of 962 Euro) for ERDF projects, while the per capita amount 
allocated to ‘intermediate’ NUTS 3 regions is less than 500 Euro. These 
‘predominantly urban’ and ‘intermediate’ NUTS 3 regions have on average higher per 
capita GDP (available for the year 2010; Eurostat 2015b) than predominantly rural 
NUTS 3 areas. 
 
 
Allocation of the funds to specific economic sectors 
East German Länder differ with respect to their local needs and their committed 
thematic objectives but also with respect to the spending of the funds for certain 
economic sectors. Saxony focuses on R&TD activities and infrastructure in research 
centres while Mecklenburg-West Pomerania made investments into regional and 
local roads by comparatively more than others. By the end of 2013, Thuringia 
invested one third of the funds into ‘unspecified’ manufacturing industries (table 2). 
Among the beneficiaries are firms in the metal working industry receiving 50 % of the 
funds of the manufacturing sector (TMWAT 2013:34). Figure 2 shows ERDF 
allocation to the economic sectors in the regions relative to their economic size. It 
could be expected that either larger economic sectors in the regions (in terms of 
employment or gross value added) receive more funds due to the fact that they 
submit comparatively more project proposals for funding than smaller sectors. 
Otherwise, economically small but influential sectors may receive comparatively 
more funds because interest groups may lobby for funds more effectively.  
                                           
1 Regions at NUTS 3 are classified into ‘predominantly rural’ based on the share of population living in 
rural grid cells and urban clusters. Rural regions – according to Eurostat (2015c) – are classified as 
rural if the rural population accounts for 50 % and more of the population and, in addition, the NUTS 3 
region contains any city with more than 200,000 inhabitants. 
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Table 2: Allocation of ERDF funds in Eastern Germany (2007-2013): Spending by economic sector 
  Thuringia Saxony Saxony-Anhalt 
Mecklenburg-West-
Pomerania 
 Economic sector 
m€ % 
Empl. 
2008 (%) m€ % 
Empl. 
2008 (%) m€ % 
Empl. 
2008 (%) m€ % 
Empl. 
2008 (%) 
00 Not applicable 10.0 0.8 - 78.6 2.7 - 231.8 12.7 - 0.3 0.0 - 
01 Agriculture, hunting and forestry 2.7 0.2 2.1 0.4 0.0 1.6 0.9 0.1 2.2 0 0.0 3.0 
02 Fishing 0 0 - 0.001 0.0 - 0 0.0  0 0.0 - 
 Manufacturing industries, of which 460.7 37.4 19.8 588.8 19.9 16.6 406.2 22.2 15.0 121.3 11.8 10.4 
03 Manufacture of food products, beverages 15.2 1.2 - 17.7 0.6 - 39.5 2.2 - 17.4 1.7 - 
04 Manufacture of textiles, textile products 4.3 0.3 - 11.0 0.4 - 0.5 0.0 - 3.8 0.4 - 
05 Manufacture of transport equipment 42.2 3.4 - 44.4 1.5 - 17.0 0.9 - 7.9 0.8 - 
06 Unspecified manufacturing industries 399.0 32.4 - 515.7 17.4 - 349.2 19.1 - 92.2 9.0 - 
07 Mining and quarrying of energy producing 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.0 0.2 0.02 0.0 0.3 0 0.0 0.1 
08 Electricity, gas, steam, hot water supply 1.1 0.1 0.5 21.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.7 14.2 1.4 0.5 
09 Collection, purification, distrib. of water 0 0 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 8.6 0.5 1.1 0 0.0 0.9 
10 Post and telecommunications 4.4 0.4 2.0 0.05 0.0 2.5 9.4 0.5 1.5 0.3 0.0 1.7 
11 Transport 130.3 10.6 4.3 62.9 2.1 5.1 10.5 0.6 5.5 4.5 0.4 5.5 
12 Construction 5.1 0.4 8.3 837.2 28.3 8.2 163.7 9.0 7.8 0.5 0.0 7.1 
13 Wholesale and retail trade 34.2 2.8 12.5 8.3 0.3 12.7 11.4 0.6 12.8 2.5 0.2 12.2 
14 Hotels and restaurants 16.2 1.3 3.7 17.9 0.6 3.9 10.5 0.6 3.6 29.9 2,9 6.5 
15 Financial intermediation 73.9 6.0 1.9 35.6 1.2 2.1 266.1 14.6 1.9 0 0.0 1.7 
16 Real estate, renting and business activities 139.4 11.3 11.9 2.9 0.1 14.0 0.008 0.0 13.8 0.7 0.1 13.1 
17 Public administration 22.3 1.8 8.0 410.6 13.9 7.1 240.4 13.1 8.6 609.7 59.3 10.3 
18 Education 39.5 3.2 6.2 417.2 14.1 6.2 159.8 8.7 6.5 89.0 8.7 6.3 
19 Human health activities 9.3 0.8 11.6 35.1 1.2 11.8 0.2 0.0 12.7 10.8 1.0 13.6 
20 Social work, community, social, personal serv.  0.01 0.0 6.1 1.6 0.1 6.5 2.4 0.1 6.2 0.6 0.1 6.9 
21 Activities linked to the environment 202.9 16.5 - 20.7 0.7 - 117.2 6.4 - 17.5 1.7 - 
22 Other unspecified services 79.2 6.4 - 422.9 14.3 - 189.5 10.4 - 126.2 12.3 - 
 Total 1232 100 1044 2962 100 1974 1829 100 1032 1028 100 750 
Source: TMWAT (2013); SMWAV (2014); MF Sachsen-Anhalt (2014); Gemeinsame Verwaltungsbehörde des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2014), VGRdL (2015).  
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Figure 2: ERDF-spending per employee by economic sector (2007-13) 
 
Note: Data on ERDF-funds by economic sector is not available for Brandenburg. The average figures 
on spending per employee in each sector for East German Länder exclude Brandenburg. Employment 
figures date from the year 2008, the beginning of the financial perspective. 
Source: own calculation based on latest implementation reports of the East German Länder in the 
year 2013, VGRdL (2015).  
 
 
The average amount of ERDF funds spent per employee varies by between 1,230 
Euro (in BB) and 1,770 Euro (in ST). In terms of gross value added (GVA), the 
average amount paid is in the range of 28,900 Euro (in TH) and 40,000 Euro (in ST) 
per million Euro GVA.  
However, some economic sectors still receive above average ERDF funds – per 
employee and GVA – while other sectors do not: In Saxony-Anhalt, for example, 
spending is outstanding in financial intermediation (13,900 Euro per employee). 
According to the implementation report in the year 2013, the funding volume reported 
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here includes financial engineering instruments (i.e. venture capital funds, guarantee 
funds) in accordance with article 44 of council regulation 1083/2006.1  
Also the Thuringian government spends an above average amount for financial 
intermediation (3,700 Euro ERDF per employee). The transport sector in Thuringia 
receives a financial amount of 2,900 Euro per employee. The manufacturing sector 
receives as much as 2,200 Euro per employee. And even the sector ‘real estate, 
renting and businesses’ obtains as much as 1,100 Euro per employee which 
represents nearly the average funding per employee. By contrast, Education in 
Thuringia is funded with 610 Euro per employee. Saxony puts more emphasis on 
education investing 15 % of ERDF and as much as 3,400 Euro per employee. 
Despite that, the manufacturing sector in Saxony receives above average payment 
per employee as well. Job creation and support for SMEs seems to be the primary 
goal behind the funding pattern. However, manufacturing employment grows by 
nearly the same rate in both regions (+3.7 %) in the period 2008 to 2012 (VGRdL 
2015). But who benefits from the structural funds? 
 
Since 2007 the regions provide the list of final beneficiaries at the individual level 
(TMWWDG 2014, SMWA 2015, Land Sachsen-Anhalt 2015, MWBT Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 2015, MWE Land Brandenburg 2015). In total, more than 66,000 
projects have been granted to more than 40,000 beneficiaries across the East 
German Länder. The list of final beneficiaries includes the names of the beneficiaries, 
the project volume, the year of granting, and the year of final payment.2 Information 
on the geographical location of the beneficiary (i.e. NUTS 3 level) is not included in 
detail.  
The granted volumes reported in the beneficiary list reflect the public financial 
support the beneficiaries receive (ERDF amount and co-financing amount from the 
Länder).3 Moreover, since the ‘paid volume’ of funds reported in the beneficiary list is 
much lower (less than a third) than that amount reported in the implementation 
report, the list contains only paid projects that were completed and for which the final 
fund rate has been paid out (bei Abschluss des Vorhabens gezahlte 
                                           
1 According to article 44 of the council regulation, “structural funds may finance expenditure in respect 
of an operation comprising contributions to support financial engineering instruments for enterprises, 
primarily small and medium-sized ones, such as venture capital funds, guarantee funds and loan 
funds, and for urban development funds, that is, funds investing in public-private partnerships and 
other projects included in an integrated plan for sustainable urban development.” 
2 Reporting standards differ by regions: some managing authorities (MV, SN, TH) report either  year of 
granting (Jahr der Bewilligung) or the year of final payments (Jahr der Restzahlung). Exceptions are 
BB and ST who report for each project listed both. 
3 The funding volume deviate from the amount reported in the implementation report. According to the 
beneficiary list of Thuringia published in June 2014, 9164 projects were granted with a volume of 
2,098 million Euro. Around 478 million Euro has been paid to completed projects. Five projects where 
listed with a value of zero. According to the 2013-report by TMWAT (2013), 9398 projects with a 
volume of around 2,000 million Euro has been granted. As much as 1,640 million Euro has been paid 
(absorption rate of 82 %) of which 1,232 million Euro has been financed by ERDF. 
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Gesamtbeträge). Neither the co-financing rate nor the intermediate payment rates for 
each project is listed.  
 
 
Allocation of funds to uncompleted projects  
A project that has been selected for funding in Thuringia receives on average 0.23 
million Euro. In Saxony the average project volume is around 94,000 Euro. The mean 
value of projects in all other East German regions is much higher than in Thuringia: 
In Brandenburg around 0.34 million Euro on average, in Saxony-Anhalt 0.40 million 
Euro on average and in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.39 million Euro on average. 
In Thuringia, 5,942 projects are still finalised representing two thirds of the number of 
granted projects. Saxony-Anhalt made final payments for 60 % of the projects. 
Managing authorities in Saxony even paid the final rate for 95 % of the number of 
projects. In Thuringia around 23 % of the granted fund has been paid, while Saxony-
Anhalt and Mecklenburg-West-Pomerania spend up to 44 % and 56 % respectively. 
Why is completion of projects in some regions higher than in other? 
 
 
Figure 3: ERDF-spending and Project length in Brandenburg and Saxony-
Anhalt (2007-13) 
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Note: Number of completed projects (N) by duration of projects in years (difference between year 
of granting and year of final payment). Amount of public funds paid by duration of projects in per 
cent of total payment.  
Source: own calculation and compilation based on the list of beneficiaries provided by Land Sachsen-
Anhalt (2015), MWE Land Brandenburg (2015). 
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The payments for completed projects follow a pattern (figure 3), that more or less 
depend on the project time. Most of the completed projects have duration of less than 
two years: In Saxony-Anhalt, for even 86 % of the projects the final rate has been 
paid two years after the project was granted. A few projects have duration of three 
years and more. Figures are similar in Brandenburg. These short-term projects 
require a comparable low share of funds. A few projects with a time horizon of 3 
years and more absorb more than half of the paid funds.  
Other East German regions do not offer the data on project length. In Thuringia, 
35 % of the number of granted projects are still uncompleted. In Saxony less than 
6 % of the number of projects is not finalised. The uncompleted projects require by 
between 44 % (in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania) and 85 % of the funding volume (in 
Saxony-Anhalt).  
Nearly a quarter of the uncompleted projects have yet a length of four years and 
more (i.e. they were granted before 2010) and require nearly half of the funding 
volume still to be paid. Some projects have – by the end of 2013 – duration of 7 
years. Intermediate payments –ot reported in the beneficiary lists - may have taken 
place, but the final rate is still to be paid. The implementation reports indicate 
comparable high funds absorption rates but the lack of completion of projects is not 
explained. 
The completion of ERDF projects depend on the selection (of potential beneficiaries) 
and how proposals have been evaluated according to specific criteria. The 
completion of projects and the funds absorption rate depend on how many project 
grants a single beneficiary receives and how many projects have to be dealt with.  
 
 
Allocation of funds to selected beneficiaries  
Table 3 shows distribution of the number of funded projects (and the project volume) 
among the beneficiaries. Most of the beneficiaries receive funds for one single 
project. Only a few beneficiaries in Thuringia (a total of 105 or 2.4 % of all 
beneficiaries) have ten and more projects supported by ERDF. In Saxony, 26,500 (or 
86 % of the) beneficiaries receive funds for a single project, while 189 (or 0.6 % of 
the) beneficiaries have successfully applied for ten and more projects. The 
distribution of projects across the beneficiaries is similar across East German 
regions. Structural funds benefit a number of applicants across the region. But, a few 
beneficiaries control the highest share of the funds. In Thuringia, 2.4 % of the 
beneficiaries receive a quarter of the funds. In Saxony, the distribution is even more 
skewed: less than one per cent of the beneficiaries receive more than 50 % of the 
granted volume.  
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Table 3: ERDF-Spending in Eastern Germany by number of projects (2007-13) 
   Total amount paid amount 
No. of 
Projects 
No. of 
Actors % actors m€ % value 
Mean p. 
benef. (m€) m€ % value 
Absorb. 
rate 
Thuringia 
1 2895 66.1 393.4 18.8 0.136 85.9 18.0 21.8 
2 639 14.6 299.8 14.3 0.469 53.8 11.3 18.0 
3 311 7.1 153.7 7.3 0.494 35.3 7.4 23.0 
4 142 3.2 127.8 6.1 0.900 34.7 7.3 27.1 
5 87 2.0 199.7 9.5 2.295 37.9 7.9 19.0 
6 84 1.9 122.9 5.9 1.464 30.5 6.4 24.8 
7 58 1.3 101.2 4.8 1.746 14.4 3.0 14.2 
8 34 0.8 75.8 3.6 2.230 22.7 4.7 29.9 
9 26 0.6 65.0 3.1 2.501 22.5 4.7 34.6 
10 23 0.5 46.1 2.2 2.004 12.7 2.7 27.5 
10+ 105 2.4 554.6 26.5 5.282 140.5 29.4 25.3 
44 1 0.02 26.1 1.2 26.090 8.1 1.7 30.9 
53 1 0.02 70.1 3.3 70.129 14.4 3.0 20.5 
84 1 0.02 68.5 3.3 68.535 10.9 2.3 15.9 
9164 4381 100.0 2,094.1 100.0 0.478 478.1 100.0 22.8 
Note: Top 3: Technische Universität Ilmenau (84 projects), Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena (53 projects), 
Institut für Photonische Technologien (IPHT) e.V. (44 projects) 
Saxony 
1 26527 86.2 705.0 17.8 0.027 396.5 23.0 56.2 
2 2583 8.4 305.3 7.7 0.118 171.2 9.9 56.1 
3 673 2.2 149.7 3.8 0.222 99.2 5.7 66.2 
4 320 1.0 104.5 2.6 0.327 62.1 3.6 59.5 
5 181 0.5 70.7 1.8 0.390 53.7 3.1 75.9 
6 125 0.4 53.9 1.4 0.431 30.5 1.8 56.7 
7 82 0.3 49.0 1.2 0.597 29.5 1.7 60.2 
8 60 0.2 52.8 1.3 0.880 39.1 2.3 74.1 
9 36 0.1 46.5 1.2 1.292 8.8 0.5 18.8 
10 31 0.1 64.0 1.6 2.065 20.8 1.2 32.4 
10+ 189 0.6 2,418.9 61.1 12.598 836.8 48.4 34.6 
117 1 0.003 73.0 1.8 72.993 47.2 2.7 64.7 
225 1 0.003 186.1 4.7 186.099 79.5 4.6 42.7 
265 1 0.003 302.8 7.7 302.777 167.7 9.7 55.4 
42282 31071 100 3,956.1 100 0.129 1,727.3 100 43.7 
Note: Top 3: Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung e.V. (265 projects), 
Technische Universität Dresden (225 Projects), Landeshauptstadt Dresden (117 projects) 
Saxony-Anhalt 
1 1645 60.7 468.0 19.1 0.285 147.9 30.4 31.6 
2 481 17.4 381.7 15.6 0.810 71.0 14.6 18.6 
3 200 7.4 92.5 3.8 0.463 33.0 6.8 35.7 
4 109 4.9 66.3 2.7 0.608 30.9 6.3 46.6 
5 71 2.6 66.2 2.7 0.932 12.0 2.5 18.1 
6 49 1.8 20.9 0.9 0.427 6.9 1.4 33.2 
7 32 1.2 75.4 3.1 2.356 10.6 2.2 14.0 
8 23 0.8 43.4 1.8 1.888 13.4 2.8 30.9 
9 20 0.7 104.0 4.3 5.201 3.9 0.8 3.7 
10 18 0.7 52.4 2.1 2.911 24.8 5.1 47.4 
10+ 89 3.3 1,126.2 46.1 12.654 156.9 32.3 19.9 
50 1 0.04 56.8 2.3 56.824 13.9 2.9 24.5 
83 1 0.04 80.7 3.3 80.682 2.5 0.5 3.1 
86 2 0.07 132.7 5.4 66.360 1.9 0.4 1.4 
6481 2709 100 2,444.7 100 0.902 486.5 100 13.9 
Note: Top 3: Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg (86 projects), Landesbetrieb für Hochwasserschutz 
(86 projects), Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (83 projects), Landeshauptstadt Magdeburg (50 projects) 
Table 3 continues 
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Table 3 continued     
   Total amount paid amount 
No. of 
Project 
No. of 
Actors % actors m € % value 
Mean p. 
benef. (m€) m € % value 
Absorb. 
rate 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
1 835 62.5 328.0 22.6 0.393 223.8 26.7 68.2 
2 164 12.5 115.3 7.9 0.690 88.3 10.5 76.6 
3 84 6.3 137.4 9.5 1.636 72.5 8.6 52.7 
4 49 3.7 40.1 2.8 0.819 21.3 2.5 53.0 
5 38 2.9 25.1 1.7 0.660 8.1 1.0 32.2 
6 24 1.8 26.0 1.8 1.085 14.9 1.8 57.1 
7 17 1.3 38.9 2.6 2.260 11.7 1.4 30.6 
8 23 1.8 43.9 3.0 1.910 7.4 0.9 17.0 
9 14 1.1 11.2 0.8 0.799 3.8 0.5 34.5 
10 15 1.0 18.7 1.3 1.249 8.0 1.0 42.7 
10+ 85 6.4 685.5 47.3 8.070 387.8 46.2 56.5 
35 1 0.07 4.7 0.3 4.726 1.4 0.2 30.5 
41 1 0.07 10.4 0.7 10.446 4.4 0.5 41.7 
97 1 0.07 25.1 1.7 25.140 8.9 1.1 35.8 
3767 1,335 100 1,451.5 100 1.087 839.7 100 56.5 
Note: Top 3: Universität Rostock (97 projects), Ernst-Moritz-Arndt Universität (41 projects), Hochschule 
Wismar (35 projects) 
Brandenburg 
1 1586 71.7 444.0 24.2 0.280 199.6 35.1 44.9 
2 326 14.7 150.1 8.2 0.460 49.2 8.6 32.8 
3 115 5.2 97.0 5.3 0.844 37.1 6.5 38.2 
4 54 2.4 49.3 2.7 0.914 11.9 2.1 24.2 
5 28 1.3 32.9 1.8 1.174 10.9 1.9 33.0 
6 19 0.9 35.0 1.9 1.842 5.6 1.0 16.0 
7 14 0.6 104.1 5.7 7.435 41.0 7.2 39.4 
8 9 0.4 17.9 1.0 1.994 1.9 0.3 10.5 
9 6 0.3 30.2 1.6 5.039 16.8 2.9 55.5 
10 8 0.4 20.2 1.1 2.526 6.9 1.2 34.2 
10+ 56 2.5 873.7 47.6 15.602 195.1 34.3 22.3 
157 1 0.05 59.0 3.2 58.975 5.6 1.0 9.5 
221 1 0.05 26.1 1.4 26.059 12.7 2.2 48.7 
234 1 0.05 61.7 3.4 61.692 15.9 2.8 25.9 
5370 2,213 100.0 1,834.4 100 0.829 568.9 100 31.0 
Note: Top3: Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus- Senftenberg (239 projects), Universität 
Potsdam (222 projects), Technische Hochschule Wildau (FH) (157 projects) 
Source: own calculation based on the list of beneficiaries provided by TMWWDG (2014), SMWA (2015), Land 
Sachsen-Anhalt (2015), MWBT Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2015), MWE Land Brandenburg (2015). 
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Table 4: Top ten beneficiaries of ERDF funds in East German Länder by amount of received funds (2007-13) 
 Thuringia Saxony Saxony-Anhalt 
Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania Brandenburg 
No. 
Name of 
Beneficiary 
%/ 
%kum Name of Beneficiary 
%/ 
%kum Name of Beneficiary 
%/ 
%kum 
Name of 
Beneficiary 
%/ 
%kum 
Name of  
Beneficiary 
%/ 
%kum 
1 Thüringer 
Aufbaubank 
6.9 Fraunhofer-
Gesellschaft e.V. 
7.7 Investitionsbank  
Sachsen-Anhalt 
10.4 Straßenbauamt 
Schwerin 
10.3 NL West, HS 
Potsdam,  
(Landesbetrieb 
Straßenwesen) 
4.1 
2 FSU Universität 
Jena 
3.3/ 
10.3 
LASuV, NL Plauen, 
(Landesbetrieb für 
Straßenbau u. 
Verkehr) 
5.0/ 
12.6 
IBG Beteiligungs-
gesellschaft Sachsen-
Anhalt mbH 
4.0/ 
14.4 
Hansestadt 
Rostock 
6.9/ 
17.2 
Investitionsbank 
Brandenburg (NO) 
3.9/ 
8.0 
3 TUUniversität 
Ilmenau 
3.3/ 
13.5 
TU Universität 
Dresden 
4.7/ 
17.3 
OvG-Universität 
Magdeburg 
3.3/ 
17.7 
Straßenbauamt 
Güstrow 
6.0/ 
23.2 
IHP GmbH - 
Microelectronics  
3.7/ 
11.8 
4 Straßenbauamt  
Nordthüringen 
2.4/ 
15.9 
LASuV, NL Meißen 4.1/ 
21.5 
Fraunhofer-
Gesellschaft e.V. 
3.2/ 
20.9 
Betrieb für Bau 
und Liegen-
schaften M-V 
5.3/ 
28.4 
TU Cottbus- 
Senftenberg 
3.4/ 
15.1 
5 Fraunhofer-
Gesellschaft e.V. 
2.4/ 
18.3 
Landestalsperren-
verwaltung 
4.1/ 
25.6 
MLU Universität Halle-
Wittenberg 
2.8/ 
23.7 
Straßenbauamt 
Stralsund 
4.3/ 
32.7 
NL Ost, NS 
Eberswalde 
3.2/ 
18.4 
6 Straßenbauamt  
Mittelthüringen 
2.1/ 
20.4 
LASuV, NL Zschopau 3.7/ 
29.3 
Landesbetrieb für 
Hochwasserschutz 
1.9/ 
25.6 
Straßenbauamt 
Neustrelitz 
3.3/ 
36.0 
TH Wildau (FH) 3.2/ 
21.5 
7 Straßenbauamt  
Ostthüringen 
1.8/ 
22.2 
LASuV, NL Leipzig 3.0/ 
32.3 
MW_Investitionsbank 1.9/ 
27.6 
Landeshauptstadt 
Schwerin 
2.0/ 
38.0 
NL West, NS Kyritz 2.5/ 
24.0 
8 Straßenbauamt 
Südwestthüringen 
1.8/ 
24.0 
Universität Leipzig 2.2/ 
34.4 
Universitätsklinikum 
Halle / Saale 
1.7/ 
29.3 
Tourismusverband 
M-V e.V. 
2.0/ 
40.1 
Stadt Frankfurt 
(Oder) 
2.2/ 
26.3 
9 Stadt Erfurt  1.4/ 
25.3 
Landeshauptstadt 
Dresden 
1.8/ 
36.3 
Leibniz-Institut für 
Neurobiologie (LIN) 
Magdeburg 
1.6/ 
30.9 
Hansestadt 
Wismar 
1.8/ 
41.8 
Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft e.V. 
2.1/ 
28.4 
10 Institut für 
Photonische 
Technologien 
(IPHT) e.V. 
1.2/ 
26.6 
LASuV NL Bautzen 1.5/ 
37.8 
Landeshauptstadt 
Magdeburg 
1.6/ 
32.5 
Universität 
Rostock 
1.7/ 
43.6 
NL Ost, HS 
Frankfurt Oder 
1.8/ 
30.2 
…  …  …  …  …  … 
Total  2,094  3,956  2,525  1,452  1,846 
Sources: own calculation based on list of beneficiaries provided by TMWWDG (2014), SMWA (2015), Land Sachsen-Anhalt (2015), MWBT Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
(2015), MWE Land Brandenburg (2015). 
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Among the beneficiaries – by number of projects implemented – we find universities 
and research institutes. The Fraunhofer Gesellschaft receives 7.7 % of funding 
volume in Saxony and is among the top ten beneficiaries in East German regions 
(table 4). Among the top ten beneficiaries are local and regional state agencies 
carrying out a number of infrastructure projects e.g. in road construction (e.g. 
Straßenbauämter). The top ten actors receive at least more than a quarter of the 
funds in Thuringia and even nearly half (44 %) of the funds in Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania. Thuringia has the lowest concentration of funds in the hands of a few (i.e. 
the top ten beneficiaries). 
Individual completion rates (i.e. absorption of funds for the completion of projects) 
tend to decrease with the number of projects a beneficiary has successfully applied 
for. Beneficiaries receiving grants for up to 4 projects) have finalised their projects 
better than beneficiaries with more ERDF projects. At the country level, Saxony has 
the highest average completion rate among the regions considered (44 % are fully 
paid out). Beneficiaries with 9 and more granted projects have a below average 
funds absorption rate. Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has paid out more than 50 % of 
the funds for completed projects, but only beneficiaries with less than two projects 
have absorbed on average a higher share of their allowed funds. The Thuringian 
completion rate is on average 23 %, but individual project completion rates tend to be 
independent of the number of projects.  
 
 
Allocation of funds by type of actor 
The beneficiaries of the structural funds can be classified according to the level of 
public and semi-public institutions as well as economic and social actors such as 
businesses, unions (Verbände), associations (Vereine) and other private actors.1 
Clustering the beneficiaries along these groups, we find that business organisations 
receive by between 28 % of the funds (in Saxony) and up to 38 % of the financial 
volume granted (in Thuringia) (table 5). Small firms and larger businesses may 
benefit via involvement of partners from unions (such as the chamber of commerce).  
Nevertheless, actors of public institutions (Länder governments, city and county 
councils as well as municipalities) are allowed to spend up to 54 % of the funds (in 
MV). At the regional (NUTS 2) level, the state actors include ministries, state banks 
and regional development agencies. At a more local level (NUTS 3), grants are given 
to the cities (Städte und kreisfreie Städte) and county councils (Landkreise) without 
                                           
1 Business organisations are identified in the datasets by the different types of establishment they 
have registered in the public trade database (e.g. AG, GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, KG, KgAA, OHG, Ltd., 
UG and mixed forms of them). Associations and unions are identified accordingly. Moreover, it was 
impossible to identity the self-employed people in the dataset since not all of them indicate that they 
receive funds for self-employment. Thus, the group of private actors contains all the projects 
conducted by actors that are listed with their names only.  
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differentiating to whom explicitly. The list contains also grants given to selected 
municipalities (Gemeinden and Gemeindeverbände below NUTS 3 level).  
At least a third of the funds are distributed to these state actors in Thuringia. 
Educational facilities (universities, business schools and research institutes) receive 
around 13 % of the funds, while Saxony allocates nearly a quarter of the funds to 
universities and research institutes. The group of beneficiaries include associations 
(e.g. for social, environmental and other reasons), unions (chambers of commerce, 
but mostly semi-public water and waste-water unions) and facilities of the religious 
community.  
The highest amounts of funds are spent by actors at the sub-national (NUTS 2) level 
(Länder governments including ministries and state banks). More local actors (NUTS 
3 level) receive comparable smaller amounts: For example, for projects to be advised 
at the local level, the cities receive together as much as 10 % of the funds and up to 
20 % of funds for projects . Municipalities and more rural Landkreise are allowed to 
conduct projects for in sum less than 5 % of the funds. The distribution of funds to 
state actors follows along the level of autonomy in decision making (national, 
regional, and local level). Actors at local (NUTS 3) level will benefit from the funds 
which are invested in their area although advice of investment decision is done at 
regional level (NUTS 2).  
Some of the major infrastructure projects are decided on the regional level. The 
financial volume a beneficiary receives for (one or more) projects vary across the 
groups of actors considered here. Average payment per beneficiary is higher for state 
actors at the regional level than on the local level. A lower volume of funds per 
beneficiary is granted to the cities and county councils. Saxony granted even double 
the amount per beneficiary at the state level than Thuringia. Educational facilities 
have comparable high average amounts granted per institute. The amount of funds 
each institute receives is accumulated over a considerable number of projects and by 
various units within institutes. Thus, the mean values for projects conducted by 
universities and research institutes are lower than for projects of government 
institutions.  
The completion of projects and the absorption of funds for completed projects vary 
considerable across regions. Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt have the lowest rate of 
funds invested in completed projects. Completion of projects in Thuringia seems to 
be independent of the number of projects a beneficiary has to deal with. Considering 
completion of projects by the type of actor it is obvious that public and semi-public 
institutions have the lowest rate of completion of projects (table 5). Businesses and 
private actors receiving funds have much higher completion rates for projects. Among 
the state actors, the lowest absorption rate could be observed for actors at NUTS 2 
level (Landesregierung). ERDF funds directed to projects at the more local city and 
municipality level is much better absorbed then at the county level.  
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Table 5: ERDF-Spending in East German Länder by type of actor (2007-13) 
 
  Total amount Paid amount 
ID Actor 
No. of 
actors 
No. of 
projects m€ % m€ % absorption 
Thuringia 
1 Land  16 98 385.0 18.4 5.9 1.3 1.5 
2 City  74 298 224.0 10.7 58.1 12.2 25.9 
3 County  27 129 48.0 2.3 21.9 4.6 45.6 
4 Municipality  166 286 34.9 1.7 10.1 2.1 28.9 
6 Religious community 14 24 2.5 0.1 0.8 0.2 32.0 
7 Business 3873 7430 795.0 38.0 213.0 44.6 26.8 
8 Educational  23 299 277.0 13.3 45.9 9.6 16.6 
9 Privat persons  52 61 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 50.0 
10 Association  78 206 93.8 4.5 16.2 3.4 17.3 
11 Union  59 333 232.0 11.1 106.0 22.2 45.7 
 Total 4382 9164 2,090.0 100.0 478.0 100.0 22.9 
Saxony 
1 Land  20 550 1075.3 27.2 138.0 8.0 12.8 
2 City  251 1481 482.7 12.2 244.7 14.2 50.7 
3 County  16 166 60.4 1.5 37.9 2.2 62.7 
4 Municipality  188 379 68.8 1.7 44.2 2.6 64.2 
6 Religious community 77 99 1.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 76.9 
7 Business 3634 8522 1108.2 28.0 696.9 40.3 62.9 
8 Educational  32 857 926.5 23.4 404.8 23.4 43.7 
9 Privat persons  26234 29808 159.5 4.0 139.3 8.1 87.3 
10 Association  100 148 20.9 0.5 18.7 1.1 89.5 
11 Union  235 291 61.0 1.5 3.7 0.2 6.1 
 Total 30787 42282 3956.1 100.0 1727.3 100.0 43.7 
Saxony-Anhalt 
1 Land  32 299 484.4 19.8 58.6 12.0 12.1 
2 City  97 585 501.9 20.5 117.7 24.2 23.4 
3 County  12 117 119.9 4.9 2.3 0.5 1.9 
4 Municipality  61 90 17.2 0.7 8.4 1.7 48.9 
6 Religious community 11 13 8.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.2 
7 Business 1869 3872 793.4 32.5 233.3 48.0 29.4 
8 Educational  22 317 343.8 14.1 19.2 3.9 5.6 
9 Privat persons  506 809 21.3 0.9 12.5 2.6 58.6 
10 Association  62 130 41.3 1.7 1.2 0.3 2.9 
11 Union  45 257 113.3 4.6 33.2 6.8 29.3 
 Total 2717 6489 2445.0 100 486.5 100.0 19.9 
Table 5 continues 
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Table 5 continued 
  Total amount paid amount 
ID Actor 
No. of actors 
No. of 
projects m€ % m€ % absorption 
Mecklenburg- West Pomerania 
1 Land  11 97 453.3 31.2 285.9 34.0 63.1 
2 City  39 180 277.0 19.1 109.7 13.1 39.6 
3 County  5 10 7.2 0.5 1.8 0.2 25.0 
4 Municipality  35 46 43.2 3.0 25.8 3.1 59.7 
6 Religious 2 2 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 25.0 
7 Business 1024 2807 458.7 31.6 333.9 39.8 72.8 
8 Educational  15 254 78.8 5.4 31.4 3.7 39.8 
9 Privat persons  126 166 21.8 1.5 17.2 2.1 78.9 
10 Association  44 78 51.0 3.5 10.6 1.3 20.8 
11 Union  35 128 60.1 4.1 23.3 2.8 38.8 
 Total 1336 3768 1451.5 100.0 839.7 100.0 57.9 
Brandenburg 
1 Land  26 623 398.2 21.6 113.7 19.6 28.6 
2 City  70 397 317.8 17.2 65.4 11.3 20.6 
3 County  19 170 61.1 3.3 8.3 1.4 13.6 
4 Municipality  76 120 55.2 3.0 7.3 1.3 13.2 
6 Religious 8 10 2.4 0.1 0.6 0.1 25.0 
7 Business 1615 2167 582.9 31.6 265.1 45.7 45.5 
8 Educational  19 880 273.4 14.8 56.1 9.7 20.5 
9 Privat persons  559 589 25.9 1.4 20.3 3.5 78.4 
10 Association  53 128 39.3 2.1 14.8 2.6 37.7 
11 Union  64 335 89.4 4.8 28.6 4.9 32.0 
 Total 2509 5419 1845.6 100.0 580.2 100.0 31.4 
Sources: own calculation and compilation based on list of beneficiaries provided by TMWWDG (2014), 
SMWA (2015), Land Sachsen-Anhalt (2015), MWBT Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2015), MWE Land 
Brandenburg (2015). 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyse the implementation of ERDF funds in East German regions 
in the financial perspective 2007-2013 to figure out how allocation of the funds 
follows the objectives formulated in the programmes. By the end of 2013 more than 
66,000 projects have been granted to more than 40,000 beneficiaries. Regional 
implementation of structural funds benefits a number of applicants. Only a few 
beneficiaries have ten and more projects supported from the ERDF. But, a few 
beneficiaries control the highest share of the funds: the top ten actors receive at least 
more than a quarter of the funds (in Thuringia) and even up to 44 % of the funds (in 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania). We find that state actors, businesses and 
educational facilities are the main beneficiaries and together receive at least 85 % of 
the funding volume. The distribution of funds to state actors follow the level of 
subsidiary in decision making (national, regional, and more local level) with higher 
amounts spent at higher levels of citizen’s interest representation.  
Although regions differ with respect to their funding priorities, some regions deviate 
by more from committed priorities than other. Concentration of the funds varies with 
respect to the geographical allocation: Only a few East German Länder provide 
ERDF expenditures at more detailed NUTS 3 level. These figures show that 
managing authorities tend to give grants to urban and intermediate NUTS 3 areas by 
more – in per capita terms - than to projects in rural areas with on average lower per 
capita GDP. Dellmuth (2011b) argues that preliminary talks between Länder 
governments, county districts and municipalities can be selective and favour specific 
areas depending on the political priorities of state governments.  
East German Länder differ also regarding the spending of the public funds in certain 
economic sectors. A few sectors still receive above average ERDF funds per 
employee and gross value added while other sectors do not. While implementation 
reports show high rates of funds absorption (i.e. in terms of grants allocated to 
projects), the list of beneficiaries show that for a considerable number of granted 
projects the final funds rate has not been paid by the end of 2013. A sizeable part of 
the budget seems to have already been distributed via intermediate payments (not 
reported in the beneficiary list), but nearly a quarter of the unclosed projects have yet 
a length of more than four years. The spending of the funds last until the end of 2015 
so that the upcoming final reports need consideration for an ex post evaluation of 
funds implementation.  
 
 28 
References 
Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J.M. (2006), Party control of state government and the 
distribution of public expenditures, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108 
No. 4, pp. 247–569. 
Bachtler, J. and Mendez, C. (2007), Who Governs EU Cohesion Policy? 
Deconstructing the Reforms of the Structural Funds, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 45 No. 3, pp. 535–564. 
Bähr, C. (2008), How does sub-national autonomy affect the effectiveness of 
structural funds?, Kyklos, Vol. 61 No. 1, pp. 3–18. 
Bauer, M.W. (2008), Introduction: Organizational change, management reform and 
EU policy-making, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 627–647. 
Bauer, M.W. (2006), Co-managing programme implementation: Conceptualizing the 
European Commission’s role in policy execution, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 13(5), 717–735. 
Bauer, M.W. (2001), A creeping transformation? The Europan Commission and the 
management of EU structural funds in Germany, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht. 
Becker, S.O., P.H. Egger and M. v. Ehrlich (2010), Going NUTS: the effect of EU 
structural funds on regional performance, Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 
94(9/10), 578-590. 
Beugelsdijk, M. and S. Eijffinger (2005), The effectiveness of structural policy in the 
European Union: An empirical analysis for the EU-15 in 1995-2001, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, 37-51. 
Bird, R.M. and Smart, M. (2002), Intergovernmental fiscal transfers: Lessons from 
international experience, World Development, 30(6): 899–912.  
Blom-Hansen, J. (2005), Principals, agents, and the implementation of EU cohesion 
policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 624–648. 
Bodenstein, T. and Kemmerling, A. (2012), Ripples in a rising tide. Why some EU 
regions receive more structural funds than others, European Integration Online 
Papers, Vol. 16. 
Bonfiglio A., Camaioni B., Coderoni S., Esposti R., Pagliacci F. and Sotte F. (2015), 
Distribution and redistribution of CAP expenditure throughout the EU, Paper 
presented at 4th AIEAA Conference, “Innovation, productivity and growth: towards 
sustainable agri-food production” June 2015 Ancona, Italy. 
 29 
Bouvet, F. and Dall'Erba, S. (2010), European regional structural funds: How large is 
the influence of politics on the allocation process, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 501–528. 
Brülhart, M. (2011), The spatial effects of trade openness: a survey, Review of World 
Economics, Vol. 147 No. 1, pp. 59-83. 
Calin-Vlad (2013), EU enlargement and the gains from trade, FIW working paper, No. 
88, FIW Research Centre International Economics, Vienna. 
Castells, A. and Solé-Ollé, A. (2005), The regional allocation of infrastructure 
investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 49 No. 5, pp. 1165–1205.  
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
1083/2006, Official Journal of the European Communities 20.12.2013.  
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general 
provisions on the structural funds, Official Journal of the European Communities 
26.6.1999. 
Cox, G.W. and McCubbins, M.D. (1986), Electoral politics as a redistributive game, 
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 48 No. 2, pp. 370–389. 
Dahlberg, M. and Johansson, E. (2002), On the vote purchasing behavior of 
incumbent government, American Political Science Review, Vol. 96 No. 1, pp. 27–
40.  
Danish Technological Institute (2005), Thematic Evaluation of the Structural Funds, 
Contributions to the Lisbon Strategy, Synthesis Report. 
De Rynck, S. and McAleavey, P. (2001), The cohesion deficit in structural fund 
policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 541–557. 
Dellmuth, L.M. (2011a), The cash divide: the allocation of European Union regional 
grants, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18 No. 7, pp. 1016–1033. 
Dellmuth, L.M. (2011b), European structural, agricultural and environmental spending 
in Germany: The allocation and implementation of EU resources, Policy Paper 
 30 
prepared at the request of Franziska Brantner, MEP, Stockholm University, April 
2011. 
Dellmuth, L.M. and Stoffel, M.F. (2012), Distributive politics and intergovernmental 
transfers: The local allocation of European Union structural funds, European 
Union Politics, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 413–433. 
Diaz-Cayeros, A., Magloni, B. and Weingast, B. (2003), Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium 
party hegemony in Mexico, Working Paper. 
Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1998), Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics, 
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 68 No. 2, pp. 153–180. 
Eurostat (2015a), Average annual population to calculate regional GDP data (in 1000 
persons), by NUTS 3 regions (nama_r_e3popgdp), Regional economic accounts 
ESA95, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, retrieved: 
10.04.2015. 
Eurostat (2015b), Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 
regions (nama_r_e3gdp), Regional statistics by NUTS classification, Regional 
economic accounts ESA95, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, retrieved: 10.04.2015. 
Eurostat (2015c), Rural - urban typology_nuts 2010, available at: 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/35209/35256/urban-rural-
typology_NUTS2010.xls/9884fa80-91c2-41d7-a11c-f082e07470b7, retrieved: 
15.12.2015. 
Gemeinsame Verwaltungsbehörde des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2014), 
Durchführungsbericht zum Operationellen Programm des Landes Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern für den Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE) im 
Ziel Konvergenz in der Förderperiode 2007 bis 2013, Berichtsjahr 2013, 
genehmigt 18.06.2014, Schwerin. 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001), Multilevel governance and European integration, 
Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham/Oxford. 
Johansson, E. (2003), Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: Empirical 
evidence from Swedish municipalities, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87 5-6, 
pp. 883–915. 
Kalman, J. (2002), Possible Structural Funds Absorption Problems, The Political 
Economy View with Application to the Hungarian Regional Development 
Institutions and Financial System, In: Gérard Marcou (ed): Regionalization for 
Development and Accession to the European Union - A Comparative Perspective, 
Edition: 2002, Publisher: Open Society Institute/ Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative, 29-64. 
 31 
Karayalcin, C. and Yilmazkuday, Y. (2015), Trade and cities, The World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 523-549. 
Kemmerling, A. and Bodenstein, T. (2006), Partisan Politics in Regional 
Redistribution - Do Parties Affect the Distribution of EU Structural Funds across 
Regions?, European Union Politics, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 373-92. 
Kemmerling, A. and Stephan, A. (2002), The contribution of local public infrastructure 
to private productivity and its political economy: Evidence from a panel of large 
German cities, Public Choice, Vol. 113, pp. 403–424. 
Kemmerling, A. and Stephan, A. (2008), The politico-economic determinants and 
productivity effects of regional transport investment in Europe, European 
Investment Bank Papers, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 36–60. 
Land Sachsen-Anhalt (2015), Liste der Begünstigten mit zugehörigen Projekten, 
Stichtag 31. Dezember 2013, OP EFRE Sachsen-Anhalt 2007-2013 (V2.5), 
Datenstand: 31.1.2014, download: Zugriff: 7.4.2015. 
Land Sachsen-Anhalt (2013), Operationelles Programm EFRE Sachsen-Anhalt 
2007–2013, vom 24. September 2007, aktualisierte Fassung vom 22. Mai 2012.  
Leigh, A. (2008), Bringing home the bacon: An empirical analysis of the extent and 
effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics, Public Choice, Vol. 137 No. 1, pp. 
279–299. 
Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J.W. (1993), A model of political equilibrium in a 
representative democracy, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 195–
209. 
Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J.W. (1987), Balanced-budget redistribution as the 
outcome of political competition, Public Choice, Vol. 52, pp. 273–297. 
Majone, G. (2000), Two logics of delevation: Agency and fiduciary relations in EU 
governance, European Union Politics, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 103–122. 
Marks, G. (1993), Structural policy and multilevel governance in the EC, in Cafruny, 
A.W. and Rosentahl, G.G. (Eds.), The state of the European Community, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder, pp. 391–407. 
Marks, G., Haesly, R. and Mbaye, H. (2002), What do subnational offices think they 
are doing in Brussels?, Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 1–23. 
Midelfart-Knarvik, K.H. and Overman, H.G. (2002), Delocation and European 
integration: Is structural spending justified?, Economic Policy, Vol. 17 No. 35, pp. 
321–359. 
Ministerium der Finanzen (MF) Sachsen-Anhalt (2014), Jahresbericht 2013, 
Europäischer Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE), Sachsen-Anhalt 2007-
2013, Interministerielle Geschäftsstelle zur Steuerung der EU-Strukturfonds (EU-
 32 
Verwaltungs-behörde) im Ministerium der Finanzen des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt, 
Magdeburg, Oktober 2014.  
Ministerium für Wirtschaft (MW) Land Brandenburg (2007), Operationelles Programm 
des Landes Brandenburg für den Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung 
(EFRE) in der Förderperiode 2007-2013, Ziel Konvergenz, Version vom 
08.08.2007. 
Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Tourismus (MWAT) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
(2007), Europäischer Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE) Operationelles 
Programm des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern im Ziel Konvergenz 
Förderperiode 2007 bis 2013, Stand 24.8.2007.  
Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Bau und Tourismus (MWBT) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
(2015), Verzeichnis der Begünstigten für die Region Mecklenburg-Vorpommern / 
Deutschland für das Jahr 2013, Europäischer Fonds für regionale Entwicklung 
(Stand: 31.12.2013), Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Bau und Tourismus M-V, 
download: Zugriff: 7.4.2015. 
Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Europaangelegenheiten (MWE) des Landes 
Brandenburg (2014),: EFRE - Durchführungsbericht 2013, Stand: 18.06.2014.  
Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Europaangelegenheiten (MWE) des Landes 
Brandenburg (2015), EFRE-Begünstigtenliste 2013, Bewilligte Projekte per 
31.12.2013, Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Europaangelegenheiten, download: 
Zugriff: 24.6.2015. 
Mohl, P. and Hagen, T. (2008), Does EU cohesion policy promote growth? Evidence 
from regional data and alternative econometric approaches, ZEW Discussion 
Paper 08-086. 
Neumark, D. and Simpson, H. (2015), Place-based policies, Handbook of regional 
and urban economics, Vol. 5B, pp. 1197-1287. 
Nichter, S. (2008), Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret 
ballot, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102 No. 1, pp. 19–31. 
Pollack, M.A. (2003), The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and 
Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Pollack, M. (1995), Regional actors in an intergovernmental play: The making and 
implementation of EC structural policy, in Rohdes, C. and Mazey, S. (Eds.), The 
state of the European Union, Vol. 3: Building a European Polity?, Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, pp. 361–390. 
Santos, I (2008), Is structural spending on solid foundations?, Bruegel Policy Brief 
2008/02. Bruegel Institute.  
 33 
Singh, T. (2010), Does international trade cause economic growth? A survey, The 
World Economy, Vol. 33 No. 11, 1517-1564. 
Solé-Ollé, A. and Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2008), Does partisan alignment affect the 
electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?, CESifo Working Paper No., Vol. 
2335. 
Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr (SMWAV) des Freistaates 
Sachsen (2013), Operationelles Programm des Freistaates Sachsen für den 
Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE) im Ziel „Konvergenz“ in 
der Förderperiode 2007 bis 2013 in der Fassung des 4. Änderungsantrages vom 
1.Oktober 2013, genehmigt durch die Europäische Kommission am 17. Dezember 
2013  
Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr (SMWAV) des Freistaates 
Sachsen (2014), Europa fördert Sachsen: Jahresbericht 2013 zum Operationellen 
Programm des Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE), Einsatz 
der Mittel aus den EU-Strukturfonds im Ziel Konvergenz 2007-2013, genehmigt 
20.05.2014. 
Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr (SMWA) (2015), Verzeichnis der 
Begünstigten im Freistaat Sachsen, letzte Aktualisierung 12/2014), Programm: 
2007DE161PO004 - Operationelles Programm EFRE Sachsen 2007-2013, 
Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, erstellt: 5.1.2015, download: 
Zugriff: 7.4.2015. 
Thüringer Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Technologie (TMWAT) (2013), 
Operationelles Programm des Freistaates Thüringen für den Einsatz des 
Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung in der Periode 2007 bis 2013, 
Jährlicher Durchführungsbericht 2013.  
Thüringer Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Technologie (TMWAT) (2007), 
Operationelles Programm des Freistaates Thüringen für den Einsatz des 
Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung in der Periode 2007 bis 2013, 
genehmigt am 26.10.2007. 
Thüringer Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Digitale Gesellschaft 
(TMWWDG) (2014), Verzeichnis der Begünstigten für die Region Thüringen/den 
Mitgliedstaat Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum 31.12.2013, Thüringer Ministerium 
für Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Digitale Gesellschaft, Erfurt, Zugriff: 12.11.2014 
VGRdL (2015), Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Bruttowertschöpfung in den Ländern der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2000 bis 2014, Reihe 1, Band 1, Arbeitskreis 
"Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder" im Auftrag der Statistischen 
Ämter der 16 Bundesländer, des Statistischen Bundesamtes und des 
Bürgeramtes, Statistik und Wahlen, Frankfurt a. M.  
 34 
Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung 
 
Jahrgang 2016 
 
Dettmer, B. Sauer, Th., 2016, Implementation of European cohesion policy at the 
sub-national level – Evidence from Beneficiary data in Eastern Germany, Jenaer 
Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 1/2016, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, 
Ernst-Abbe-Hochschule Jena. 
 
 
Jahrgang 2015 
 
Millner, R., Stoetzer, M.-W., Fritze, Ch., Günther, St., 2015, Fair oder Foul? 
Punktevergabe und Platzierung beim Eurovision Song Contest, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 2/2015, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Ernst-Abbe-
Hochschule Jena. 
 
Stoetzer, M.-W., Blass, T., Grimm, A., Gwosdz, R., Schwarz, J., 2015, Was ist fair? 
Echte und strategische Fairness in einem sequentiellen Ultimatum- und Diktarotspiel, 
Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 1/2015, Fachbereich 
Betriebswirtschaft, Ernst-Abbe-Hochschule Jena. 
 
 
Jahrgang 2014 
 
Osborn, E., Stoetzer, M.-W., 2014, Does Gender really Matter? An Analysis of Jena 
University Scientists Collaboration with Industry and Non-Profit-Partners, Jenaer 
Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 2/2014, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, 
Ernst-Abbe-Hochschule Jena. 
 
Stoetzer, M.-W., Beyer, C., Mattheis, J., Schultheiß, S., 2014, Der Einfluss der 
Studiengebühren auf die Zahl der Studienanfänger an deutschen Hochschulen, 
Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 1/2014, Fachbereich 
Betriebswirtschaft, Ernst-Abbe-Fachhochschule Jena. 
 
 
Jahrgang 2013 
 
Giese, St., Otte, F., Stoetzer, M.-W., Berger, Ch., 2013, Einflussfaktoren des 
Studienerfolges im betriebswirtschaftlichen Studium: Eine empirische Untersuchung, 
Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 1/2013, Fachbereich 
Betriebswirtschaft, Ernst-Abbe-Fachhochschule Jena. 
 
 
Jahrgang 2011 
 
Herold, J., Ahrens, B., 2011, Reversibilität und Irreversibilität – Mathematische 
Untersuchungen zum Zeitverhalten des Produktlebenszyklus, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 5/2011, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule 
Jena. 
 
 35 
Stoetzer, M., Pfeil, S., Kaps, K., Sauer, T., 2011, Regional dispersion of cooperation 
activities as success factor of innovation oriented SME, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 4/2011, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule 
Jena. 
 
Kaps, K., Pfeil, S., Sauer, T., Stoetzer, M., 2011, Innovationsbedingte 
Beschäftigungs- und Umsatzeffekte bei Unternehmen im Raum Jena, Jenaer 
Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 3/2011, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, 
Fachhochschule Jena. 
 
Kaps, K., Pfeil, S., Sauer, T., Stoetzer, M., 2011, Innovationskooperationen und 
Wissenstransfer von Unternehmen im Raum Jena, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 2/2011, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule 
Jena. 
 
Herold, J., Polzin, K., 2011, Zeitvarianz und Zeitinvarianz – Mathematische 
Untersuchungen zum Zeitverhalten des Produktlebenszyklus, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 1/2011, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule 
Jena. 
 
 
Jahrgang 2010 
 
Kaps, K., Pfeil, S., Sauer, T., Stoetzer, M., 2010, Strategische Ausrichtung und 
Innovationstätigkeit von KMU im Raum Jena, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 3/2010, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule 
Jena. 
 
Herold, J., Völker, L., 2010, Zufall und Notwendigkeit - Untersuchungen zur 
mathematischen Modellierung des Produktlebenszyklus, Jenaer Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 2/2010, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule 
Jena. 
 
Schwartz, M., Hornych, C., 2010, Informal networking - An overview of the literature 
and an agenda for future research, Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 
1/2010, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule Jena. 
 
 
Jahrgang 2007 
 
Stoetzer, M.-W., Krähmer, C., 2007, Regionale Nachfrageeffekte der Hochschulen – 
Methodische Probleme und Ergebnisse empirischer Untersuchungen für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 6/2007, 
Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule Jena. 
 
Bösch, M., Heinig, R., 2007, Der Verkauf von Non Performing Loans durch deutsche 
Kreditinstitute - Betriebswirtschaftliche Notwendigkeit versus rechtliche Zulässigkeit -, 
Jenaer Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung Heft 5/2007, Fachbereich 
Betriebswirtschaft, Fachhochschule Jena. 
 
 
